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ESSAY 

LEGISLATIVE MESSAGING AND BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Karen Gross, Kathryn R. Heidt andLois R. Lupica· 
This Essay grew out of many three-way conversations and multiple 
collaborative drafts. We began this conversation at the academic conference 
in 2003 celebrating the Bankruptcy Code's upcoming 25th Anniversary. 
Sadly, we did not have the opportunity to finish either the conversations or to 
finalize this Essay before Kate Heidt's untimely death in May 2005. 
Completed in her absence, this Essay is dedicated to the memory ofour close 
friend and colleague, Professor Kathryn R. Heidt. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Some eighteen months ago, scholars, judges and lawyers celebrated the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code's 25th anniversary, remarking on its extraordinary 
architecture and resiliency.' None claimed the Code was perfect; given, 
however, the plethora ofchanges in the legal and financial markets since its 
• Karen a..... is a ProfeuorofLaw at NewYml< Law School aodaOOIItribuqoUibortoCollicr 
on Bankruptcy; Lois R. Lupica is Aaaociate Dean aod Professor nf Law at the University of Moine Law 
School and is Chair nfthe AALS Creditors' aod Debtors' Rights Section. Kathryn R. Heidi, prior to her 
passins, was a Professor of Law at the Univ..,ity of PillllburaJl School nf Law aod Chair of the ABA 
Business Bankruptcy Committee. We thank Erib Lazu, New Yml< Law School, Class of2006, for her 
remarkable research usislance. We abo thank Justin Weiss, University nfMIIine Sebool ofLaw, Claaa of 
2007, for his excellent resean:h assistance. 
I. To be sme, there were detractors, but they were far aod few~- Su generally Ralph 
Brubokcr&Kcnnetb N. Klee, Re.rolvwi: The 1978 Bankruptcy CodeluuHt!naSucceu, 12 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REv. 273 (2004) (Debate at the American Baokruptcy Illllitute's U.S. Banknlptcy Law 11 an 
Economic Crossroads Symposium, Washington D.C. (poea:nted Oct. II, 2003)); Nicholas J, Mauro & 
Melaoie J. Schmid, Introduction, 12 AM. BANKil.INST. L REv. i (2004). 
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initial enactment, the theme running through many commentators' remarks 
was that the Code had proved imelf remarkably flexible and resilient, despite 
repeated testing. 2 Emblematic ofits successful structure is the fact that annual 
case filings rose from 331,264 in 1980 to more than 1.66 million in 2003, and 
yet the system continued to function ably. 3 As the economy floundered, the 
consumer bankruptcy system provided millions ofpeople who had suffered 
fmancial distress-whether as a result of a medical crisis, a job loss, family 
crisis or some other woe or flawed decision-making-a necessary safety net.• 
The business bankruptcy provisions enabled thousands ofsmall, medium and 
large businesses to reorganize or proceed with orderly liquidations.' 
More recently, this same Bankruptcy Code was overhauled by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
("BAPCPA" or the "2005 Amendments")," with legislators conunenting that 
changes to the Code were urgently needed and long overdue! The 2005 
Amendments, reflected in a bill exceeding 300 pages in length, dramatically 
changed or, in some instances, tweaked, almost every Code section. 
Moreover, a host of new provisions were added, including an entirely new 
chapter addressing international insolvencies.• 
These two end-points-a 25th anniversary commemoration and a major 
substantive overhaul within months ofeach other-provide an opportunity to 
ask some questions that are by no means unique to bankruptcy: What 
messages are produced by new legislative pronouncemenm; and how do we 
2. See generally Brubaker & Klee, supra note I; John E. Matejkovic & Keidl Rucinski, 
Banlcruptcy "'Reform": The 21st Century's Debtors' Prison, 12 AM. BANKR.INST. L. REv. 473 (2004). 
3. Annual Business and Nm-business Filings by Year (1980-2005), http://www.abiwc.-ld .org/ 
Content/Coot entGroups/Onl ine_Resources !/Bankruptcy_stati sticsJ/Statisti c s _ Geo eral/ 
Annual_ Business_ and_Non-business _Filings_ by_Year_ ( 1980·2005).bhn (last visited May 13, 2006) 
[hereinafter Statistics]. 
4. David U. Himmelstein <t al.,lllness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, W5 HEALTH 
AFF. 63, 65 (2005)(wc:b exclusive), http://contmthealtbaffairs.oJ"S'cgi/n:printlblthaff.w5.63v I Oast visited 
Jan. 19, 2006). 
5. Statistics, supra note 3 (finding there were 43,694 business bankrupll:y filings in 1980, 82,446 
in 1987 and 34,317 in 2004 ). 
6. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protoction Act of2005, Pub. L No. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23. 
1. F. JAMESSENSENBRENNER, H. COMM. ON THEJUDJCIARV, BANKRUPTCY AllUSE AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION AcT OF 2005, H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. I, at 3-4 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
88,90-91 [hereinafter SENSENBRENNER REPORT). 
8. II U.S.C.A. §§ 1501-1532 (West2005). 
9. In this paper, we do not address the immensely complex issue of how to int.,.-etlegislation 
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decode them? How does one come to understand both the need for and the 
meaning ofnew legislation, particularly ifthe surface meanings seem to mask 
deeper political, social or cultural influences and beliefs? Even when we can 
fully and accurately identify the proffered messages, is newly created 
legislation always the best response to the events that precipitated the change? 
These questions dovetail the long-standing jurisprudential debate 
concerning the meaning of legislative pronouncements. Out of this debate, 
two dominant conceptions ofthe meaning oflegislation emerge. One school 
of thought views the process ofcreating legislation as a true communicative 
enterprise.10 As such, legislation performs a signaling function, and the 
emitted signal is to be read in accordance with the "accepted standards of 
communication in effect in the given environment."'' This perspective 
suggests that the meaning ofthe legislation is reflected within the legislation 
itself-as a stand-in for the legislature's intentions and the direct means by 
which those intentions are manifested. Stated most simply, understanding 
legislation's signals has wide-ranging implications for how one interprets the 
meaningofstatutes. How one divines those intentions, whether the intentions 
are overt or not, and whose actual intentions are implicated are complexities 
raised by this approach. 
A contrasting view rejects the idea that legislation comes about as a result 
ofan intentional communicative process. 12 Adherents to this position believe 
that statutes fail to meet the requirements for communicative signaling 
because in order to fmd communication, the communicator must actually 
"intend" the communication, and the audience must be receptive to the 
intended message." Proponents of this approach note that gleaning the 
"intent" ofa legislative body is an implausible exercise because a legislature 
is comprised ofa disparate group ofindividuals, likely holding both majority 
and minority ideas.•• Thus, identification of the "intent" behind a 
compromised pronouncement is folly." Accordingly, statutes are not 
CDBCicd yean~, decades or even centuries ago. Our focus, instead, is on understanding newly cnacted laws. 
While there is some ovaiap tobe sure, the introduotion oflegislation--as opposed to interpreting existing 
law-raises impor1Bnt difteratt issues, including wby the new legislation """ needed in the first instance 
and how it wiD be implemented within the cotisting frameworks. 
10. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 10 (1975). 
II. Id. 
12. Heidi M. Hurd, Sove,.,ignty in Silence, 99 YALE LJ. 945, 956-57 (1990). 
13. Id. at 960. 
14. /d. at 971-72. 
15. The challenges made to the ides of legislative intent are many: Realist Model, Inlelprctive 
Model, Majoritarian Madel, Nature of Mental States, AnlhropollXlrpbic Madel, Delegation Mode~ and 
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"authoritative communications" of the legislatw"e, 16 but rather "empirical 
descriptions ofoptimal legal arrangements."" This approach advocates that 
legislation does not function as a signal of the legislatw"e's intention, but 
rather as a sign possessing natural, self-contained meaning.'" A sign is a 
symptom ofa condition to which it has a causal relationship.•• The goal is to 
identify and understand the condition and thus discern the meaning of that 
sign.>• 
Each ofthese perspectives has merit and adds much to the thinking about 
new legislation and its meaning. Looking for interpretive guidance may tum 
on the persuasive impact ofeach respective argument. The contribution this 
debate makes to resolving the issues addressed in this Essay is the shared 
recognition that both communicative and descriptive expressions in legislation 
convey messages. It is the identification and unpacking of the meaning of 
these messages that interests us. Whether the messages are communicative or 
descriptive, they speak volumes about the climate in which legislation is 
enacted and how it will be implemented. For those concerned with the 
transparency and functionality of legal regimes, the central and important 
question is what messages legislative enactments convey. 
Given that legal, social, cultural and economic landscapes are dynamic 
and ever-changing, it is only natural to ask whether the messages sent by the 
legislative pronouncement are an accurate reflection of and response to 
current environmental circumstances. Certainly in the bankruptcy 
context-where first we were lauding and then, within months, dramatically 
changing the same law-profound and compelling questions have surfaced 
concerning the messages conveyed by BAPCP A. These messages can best be 
understood in the context of the political process, the dominant cultural and 
social norms, and the economics of the marketplace. In recent years, this 
context has included major galvanizing events-environmental disasters, 
occurrences ofterrorism, and the Enron and WorldCom debacles to name but 
a few. Such events generated not only media attraction, but also legislative 
responses.21 
Constructive Model See id. at 968-76. 
!6. !d. at 950. 
17. !d. at951. 
18. !d. at953-54. 
19. !d. 
20. See supra note 9. This Essaydoes not nddress the interpretation of existing statutes. 
21. See Bruce Grahsgal, New Law Deals Severe Blow to KERPS. Severance Programs, J. CORP. 
RENEWAL, Aug. 200S,available athttp://www.turnaround.orw'J>rint/allicles.asp?mode=issue&issue=l64 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2006); see also Amy Barrus, Credilors Will Crack the Whip: Tough New Rules Will 
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Moreover, the messages can only be fully understood and appreciated in 
the context of how the system was perceived to be and how it was actually 
operating before the amendments-as well as in the context of how the 
system, post-amendment, will work when it is operationalized. Once the law 
begins to operate, the real and practical impact of the 2005 Amendments on 
the bankruptcy system and its participants will be evident. We see messaging 
as a phenomenon that can only be untangled by a complex and deliberate 
contextualizing of the 2005 Amendments. 
Related to the question of what messages are conveyed by legislative 
enactments is the matter of the nature of the enacted legislation itself. If 
legislation is warranted, how should that legislation be crafted? Should it be 
targeted to a particular problem or issue or should it be broader in its 
orientation? The issue is when and what type of legislation (or legislative 
amendment), ifany, is needed to respond to changed and changing conditions. 
Consideration must also be given to whether pausing and permitting more 
gradual but perceptible market responses or judicial decisions (or some 
combination of the two) are better ways to address the actual and perceived 
problems. In other words, legislating-whatever its message-may not 
always be the best solution, despite our predisposition to its employment. 
This very tendency to legislate too freely has led to a condition known as 
hyperlexis.22 
To be sure, none of these are simple questions and there are no easy 
answeB-in bankruptcy or any other substantive field of law. The newly 
enacted amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, however, offer a prime 
illustration ofembedded legislative messaging. In this Essay, we explore the 
meaning ofat least one ofthe major messages we believe is conveyed by the 
bankruptcy legislation. In so doing, we address the factors that assist us in 
divining this message, and we also address the larger issue ofhow embedded 
messages manifest themselves. We further consider a related interesting 
question which has surfitced in the bankruptcy context, namely the failure to 
legislate. We ask specifically whether failing to legislate is also a message, 
and, if so, what that message of silence means-at least in the bankruptcy 
Make Corporrue Bankruptcies ··~icker and More BrufiJ/, •• Bus. WK., July4, 2005, at 82. 
22. Bayless Manning, Hyperlt!Xis: Our National Disease. 11 Nw. U. L. REv. 767, 767 (1977) 
(co~ tbe term "h)l>OI'lexis"to describe "American 'snationaldisease-tbepatbologicalconditioo caused 
byao overactive law-making gland. Measured by aoy aod every index, our law is exploding. New statutes, 
regulations, and ordinances are increasing at geometric rates at all levels ofgovenunent The same is true 
ofreported decisions by couns aod administrative agencies."). We do not mimic Manning's broad use of 
. the term aod. thus, we are taking liberties in applying it in a ruurower c~text. 
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arena. Hopefully, some ofthe insights with respect to bankruptcy law-both 
with respect to what was and was not chaiige~are transportable as others 
contemplate the messages inherent in new legislation in other substantive 
fields. 
To this end, this Essay begins with a discussion of messaging in 
bankruptcy and then turns to examine examples drawn from the Bankruptcy 
Code in terms of instances in which changes were made and other instances 
in which amendments were not enacted. We focus our attention on four 
emblematic issues-two involving changes made to the Bankruptcy Code 
(namely, the addition of requirements for approving key employee retention 
plans (known as KERPS) and the pre-bankruptcy consumer credit counseling 
mandate)'3 and two involving instances where amendments could have been, 
but were not, made (the definition of future claims and the Code's treatment 
of limited liability companies (LLCs)).24 
ll. MESSAGES SENT 
Ifone looks holistically at the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 
a common thread runs through many ofthe amended provisions: a movement 
away from flexible guidelines or standards that are malleable enough to 
respond to a variety ofsituations--one ofthe hallmarks ofthe pre-amendment 
Bankruptcy Code. These standards have largely been replaced by rigidly 
constructed rules with detailed timetables, procedures and requirements. The 
move from a standards-based to a rule-based approach is achieved through 
what we refer to as "particularization. "25 
Most fundamentally, a particularized statute is designed to address a 
myriad ofspecific circumstances, instance by instance. It has the capacity to 
target either selected players in the bankruptcy process or specific actions or 
circumstances. Ifsomeone or something is so targeted, a particularized Code 
dictates results or at least mandates choices. Such detailed targeting must 
anticipate a plethora of contexts and, not smprisingly, often results in the 
dramatic expansion of the literal length of the Code. Thus, a statute that has 
been particularized is transformed from a set of standards that apply to all 
parties impacted or affected by the law to a detailed-often exquisitely--set 
23. II U.S.C.A. §§ 109(b), S03(c), Ill (West2005). 
24. Future claims is not includc:d in the definition of'"claim" in the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, 
the definition ofcorporation in Section I 0 I (g) includes no reference to limited liability companies. II 
U.S.C.A. § IOI(g) (West 2005). 
25. See Manning, supra note 22, at 767. 
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ofspecific, targeted dictates. In eliminatingor substantially curtailingjudicial 
discretion, the particularized rules, rather than case law, become authoritative. 
To understand fully the move toward particularization in the context of 
bankruptcy law, one needs to step back and broadly reflect upon the changes 
made to the Code and the rhetoric that accompanied their enactment. Many 
proponents of the 2005 Amendments-Republicans and Democrats 
alike-articulated that the changes were an effort to curb abuses and to 
prevent bad actors from taking advantage of the bankruptcy system's 
benefits.>• According to the bill's "history," the 2005 Amendments were an 
attempt to "improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal 
responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the 
system is fair to both debtors and creditors.'m 
Among the provisions that evidence this objective is the amended Section 
707(b).28 This section, relating to the dismissal of cases, now contains the 
widely and popularly discussed "means test."29 As a general matter, it is hard 
to argue against legislation that attempts to derail abusers and eliminate 
cheating. Few would take issue with the idea that people who can readily pay 
all oftheir legitimate debts in full should do so. And even for those ofus who 
believe that former Section 707 addressed that very issue fairly and 
effectively, legislation designed to achieve integrity and fairness is, at the 
meta level, a positive development. So, if there is a direct correspondence 
between the harm the legislation is designed to address and the fix, then it 
would seem-at least at first blush-that such a particularized provision is a 
warranted and appropriate response. 
But-and here is the proverbial but-in looking at the 2005 Amendments 
as a whole, we have been struck by the disjuncture between what these 
changes seek to accomplish on the surf~U»-at the level of broad generality 
and in the accompanying rhetoric-and what emerges from a careful 
contextual assessment of the particularized provision enacted to effectuate 
those changes. Within seven subsections and literally hundreds of words, 
26. SENSENBRENNER REPORT, supra note 7, at 3-4, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.AN. at 89-92. 
27. /d. at 2, as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.AN. at 89. 
28. See Bankruptcy Abuse and Conswner Protection AA:tof200S, cb. I, sec. 102, § 707, 119 Slat. 
23,27-32. 
29. II U .S.C.A. §707(b) (West 2005);see also Marianoe B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Taking 
the New Consumer Ban/rn,ptcy Mode/for a Test DriW!: Means-Te.rtlng Reo/ Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM. 
BANKR.INST. L. REv. 27 (1999); Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out ofNonsense: Representing 
Consumers Under the "Bankrupfl:)l Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of2005, ·• 79 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 191, 193-204 (2005); Eugene R. Wedoff; Means Testing in the New 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 231 (2005). 
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Section 707(b) now includes a myriad of detailed requirements identifying 
which individual debtors will bepermitted to remain in the Code's liquidation 
chapter (Chapter 7) and which debtors will have their cases dismissed.30 The 
application of the means test requires a host of new forms, rules and cross­
referencing to non-bankruptcy databases for information to determine whether 
specified thresholds are met (for example, the median family income in the 
debtor's state for a family ofsimilar size).31 It requires debtors, who are often 
at a crisis point, to present detailed documentation of their fmancial 
circumstances.32 Once this cumbersome and procedurally burdensome 
provision is operationalized, it will not improve bankruptcy law and practice, 
but have the effect, we suspect, of shutting many ''honest but unfortunate 
debtors"33 out of the bankruptcy system. Consider, for example, the impact 
of the new legislation on the victims ofHurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
The political, social and economic climate in which these amendments 
were adopted is instructive in our quest to divine their embedded messages. 
We are living in a time of weakening social safety nets. Individuals are 
increasingly being asked to look inward or to the private sector for the most 
basic level ofsubsistence. Our ownership society, despite its surface appeal, 
has had trouble reaching those who live in our poorest neighborhoods and in 
our lowest income quartiles.34 These are observations offact-<lbservations 
about the demographic context within which the Code was amended. 
Regardless ofone's political proclivities, the demographics are hard to deny. 
In looking at the 2005 amendments to the BankruptcyCode in the context 
in which they were enacted and in thinking specifically about how the 
bankruptcy system works in practice, we see something other than the just 
identified surface purposes emerging. A different and ultimately more 
troubling message about the bankruptcy system and its players is being 
advanced: distrust. 
30. II U.S.C.A. § 707(b). 
31. U.S. TRUSTEE PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CENSUS BUREAU MEDIAN FAMILY 
iNCOME BY FAMILY SIZE (IN 2004 INFLATION-ADJUSTED DOLLARS), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ust/eoJbapcpalbci_data/median_income_table.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). 
32. II U.S.C.A. § 707(b). 
33. Cf Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244(1934)(noting tbata purposeofthe bankruptcy 
act was to "relieve the honest debtor fiom the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start 
afresh"). 
34. See President George W. Bush, President's Remarks at the 2004 Repubtican National 
Convention (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www .whitdlouse.govmewslreleases/2004109/print/ 
20040902-2.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006); David Callahan, Opinion, Bush's Ownership Society: Great 
Idea, JfLow-/1JCOme Families Benefit, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR (Boston, MA), Sept. 21, 2004, at 9; JiU 
Lawmtce, Some Ask Who Belongs in 'Ownership Society,' USA ToDAY, Mar. 22,2005, at A4. 
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The theme ofdistrust does not appear in the words ofthe Code; nor does 
it appear as a clear or articulated theme in the legislative history. But it is, we 
think, one of the central messages radiating from the 2005 bankruptcy 
amendments. The particularized amendments, when assessed in light ofboth 
their effects in practice, as well as the social, political and economic context 
in which they were enacted, reveal a distrust ofmany central participants in 
the bankruptcy process. Included among the distrusted groups are debtors 
(most particularly consumer debtors, former officers ofcompanies that have 
failed due to fraud or other wrongdoing, and those in management ofmega 
Chapter II cases), debtors' lawyers (specifically those representing 
consumers}, and the judiciary (most particularly the bankruptcy bench). In 
essence, it is the distrust ofthese central participants that has led to legislation 
that strips these very participants of flexibility. The new particularized rules 
attempt to circumscribe the central participants' conduct within the 
bankruptcy system. Stated differently, particularized legislation is the vehicle 
for communicating distrust 
What is pernicious is that the message ofdistrust has not been raised or 
openly debated. As such, this means that the process of crafting the 
legislation did not delve into whether the distrust is or is not warranted. 
Instead, we have assumed its accuracy and legislated away discretion and 
disabled these "untrustworthy actors" from fully participating in the system. 
What we have now is evidence of the distrust; what we are missing is the 
empirical support for it. Aswe operationalize the new Code, we will regularly 
confront the evidence ofdistrust. How we handle that evidence affects how 
the Code will operate in practice-a topic we address later. 
ill. AMENDED SECTION 503: KEY EMPLOYEE RETENTION PAYMENTS 
A prime example ofa particularized amendment whose message can only 
be understood in light of the context in which it was enacted is found in 
Section 503(cV' Entitled "Allowance ofAdministrative Expenses," Section 
503 has been amended to outline the terms of when and to what extent 
payments may be made to retain key employees ofa reorganizing debtor firm 
(commonly known as "KERP" payments or plans).36 To be sure, KERP 
35. See generally BanknsptcyAbuse and Consumer Protection Act of2005, ch. 3, sec. 331, § 503, 
119 Stat. 23, 102..03. The amendment to§ 503(c)was the result ofa motion by SenatorKennedy(D.MA) 
on Feb. 17, 2005, during the SenateJudiciluy Committee markup ofSenale BiD 256 and proposed ID limit 
retention bonuses, sev011111cepay, and other payments ID insiders ofthe debtorunder certain circumstances. 
36. Seeid. 
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payments to essential managers have historically been commonplace in large 
reorganization cases and the dollars distributed are often sizeable." For 
The effmt to ~evise the law afli:cting KERPs did not arise until late in the legislative process in an 
amendm111t added during the Senate markup ofthe bill, under the section "Preventing Corporate 
Bankruptcy Abuse." Testifying in support of the amCIIdment during a February lOth appearance 
before the U.S. Senate Committee on theJudiciary,DaveMcCall,a director wid! the United Steel 
Workers ofAmerica, AFLCIO, characterized letention programs as a fonn ofcorporate abuse. 
Grohsgal, supra note 21; PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GAitRISON Ll.P, BANKRUPTCY CoDE 
AMENDMENTS AFFECTING BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES 10 (Apr. 15, 2005). available at http:// 
www .paul weiss.com/files/Publication/34ec8540-7c31-4 020-b264-49cba945a202/ 
Presentation/Public:ationAitacbmattl3b487d25-e986-47~-503481024fdb/Bankruptcy'Yo20Code.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2006) ("Clearly, these amendments ale designed to reign in what bas been viewed in 
rec111t years as overly generous letention, severance and other compensation-related arrangements given 
to members ofthe debtor's existing management to incentivizc them to remain with the debtcr during the 
chapter II case."). See generally LYNN M. LoPucK~ CoURTING FAIWRE: How CoMPETITION FOR BIG 
CASES Is CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY CoURTS (2005) (discussing the evils of KERPs and a view that 
the U.S. bankruptcy system "s COiruption and breakdown bas directly led to the major corporate failures of 
the last decade, including those ofEmon, MCI, WorldCom, and Global Crossing). 
37. DavidA. Skeel, Jr., Employee., Pensions. and Governance in Chapter I I, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
1469, 1473-76 (2004); Allism K. Verderber Herriott, Commen~ Toword an Undersfllnding of the 
Dialectical Tensions Inherent in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans During Banicruptcy, 98 Nw. U. 
L REv. 579, 582-83 (2004); see also Borrus, supra note 21, at 82 ("Since the 1990s, so-called key 
employee retention pi1111&-0ffcring "pay to stay" bonuses to manageB--bave become a staple ofbusin<&s 
bankruptcies. Critics harp that the practice is misguided, rewarding the team that sleercd the company into 
trouble. A 1989 study by Harvard Business School professor Stuart C. Gilson sbowingtbatcbiefexecutives 
who depart big bankrupt companies rarely land top jobs elsewbere supports the view that such managers 
don't deserverewards."); Len Boselovic, Seeing Green in the Red; KeyEmployees PaidBonusa to Remain 
During Banlrruptcies, PrrTsauRGH PoST-GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2001, at El ("Cash-strapped Pacific Gas & 
Electric was baokrupted by its inability to recover billiCIIS ofdollars in fuel charges fiom its customers. 
Yet somehow, Califania's largest investor-owned utility could afli>rd paying an C<tra $17.4 million to more 
than 200 of its key managers. All across America, distressed companies are paying out millions to prevent 
employees from abandoning what may be sinking ships."); Ann Davis, Want Some Extra Cash? File for 
Chapter II, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31,2001, at Cl; Daniel Doyle, Sink or Swim? Retention Payments Can 
Speed Reorganization By Keeping Key People, or They Can Entrench BadManagement, ST. LoUts PosT­
DISPATCH, Mar. 20,2005, at F7 C'ATA Airlines, a low-cost carrier based at Midway Airport in Cbicngo, 
promised to double the base salary of managers if they sta)'Cd with the company through bankruptcy 
proceedings."); Nelson D. Schwartz It al., Greed-Mart: Attention, Kmart Investors. The Compony May 
Be Bankrupt, but Its Top Brass Have Been Raking It In, FoRTUNE, Oct. 14,2002, at 139; KarC11 Talaski, 
Kmart May NeedMore Recovery Time; Creditors. Adamson Concur that July 2003 Target Date to Emerge 
from Bankruptcy Could Be Too Soon, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 24, 2002, at IB ("(Judge] Sonderby also 
approved employment agreements fur Kmart's top five executives along with a Key Employee Retention 
Plan, which sets up a bonus schedule for the company's top 10.000 employees."); Chris Woodyard & 
Martin Kasindorf,Enron Execs Pocket Big Bonuses, USATODAY, Feb. I, 2002, at JB; Lorene Yue,Kmart 
Lines Up Cash for New Boss, DETROIT FlEE PREss, Apr. 5, 2002, at lA; Robert J. Keach, The Case 
Against KERPS 2 (Am. Bania. Insl, Annual Spring M"'ting. Apr. II, 2003), available at 
http://bridgenet.bridgellc.rom/assignments.t:lasso/o202o/o20_'Yo20Pre-FIIing%20KERPS'Yo20+"A.20Director 
zone'Yo20insolvenc)l'/o20090804/KERP%20Jssues/Keach_Th.pdf(last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (discussing 
case Jaw on KERPs and arguing for the curtailment ofthe. use ofKERPs). 
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example, the retention bonuses paid to executive vice presidents ofAdelphia 
were up to 200% of their base salaries, provided certain performance goals 
were met." In the Jacobson's bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved 
bonuses of $5.3 million to be paid to 190 of its top employees.39 Such 
payments, made from a finite pool of resources, exemplify a tension familiar 
in Chapter 11 cases: balancing the interests ofworkers and other creditors in 
getting paid with the debtor's interest in a successful reorganization. These 
payments did not happen, however, outside the purview ofthe courts: courts 
regularly are presented with applications for employee retention.40 The courts 
38. Mike Fan-eO, 'Definitive' Adelphia Sale Bolsters 2 Top Cable Q.>s, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, 
Apr. 25, 2005, at I (discussing Adelphia gaining approval of a KERP in April 2005 that will give 
employees at the executive vice president level bonuses of up to 200% oftheir base salaries if they meet 
certain performance goals. This happened lllllidst the approval ofan auctioo bid by Time Warner Inc. and 
Comcast Corp.); see also Kris Frieswick, What's Wrong With This Picture? Polaroid's Passge Through 
Chapter 1 I Expases How Bankruptcy Can Give Debtors Too Much Power, CFO, Jan. 2003, at 40, 43: 
In November, [Polaroid] sought the court's permission to pay top executives wbo bad stayed 
through the filing ... up to $19 million in so-called key-employee retention prognuns (KERPs), 
including some proceeds fi:om any future sale ofthe company. While KERPs are common, Judge 
Walsh balked at the amount. He eventually capped a total package at $6 million .... 
39. Karen Talaski, Jacobson to &veal Earnings; Financial Results, Monthly Updates to Show 
Retailer's Health Since BanlrTuptcy Filing, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 12, 2002, at IB (''The US. Bankruptcy 
Court in Detroit agreed to allow Jacobson's to pay its top 190 employees as much as $5.3 million in 
bonuses if they stay ... during its recrganimtion. By comparisat, Kmart's b<llus plan bas nearly 10,000 
participants and rings in at S175 millioo. "); .ree also Doug Campbel~ Execs to Get Banlcruptcy Windfalls, 
Bus. J. (Oreensbom'Winston-Salem, NC), Dec. 27, 2002, available at http://ttiad.b~oumals.com/ 
triad/stories/2002/12/30/storyl.btml (lastvisited Jan. 19, 2006) (discussing !be n:tentioo plans ofbanknlpt 
textile companies: 
Besides trying to lead his company out ofbankruptcy protection, Galey & Lonl CEO Anbur 
Wiener bas something else to look forward to in 2003: a $1.2 million bonus. Wiener'swind&ll is 
the richest part ofa $5.2 million "keyemployee mtention program" encompassing 62 top OltCCUiives 
at Greensboro-based Galey & Lonl .... 
. . . Burlington Industries, which sought bankruptcy protection in Noveniler 200I and plans to 
emerge in the middle of2003, bas a $9.4 millinn incentive plan for 71 key emplo~ 111 part of its 
restructuring.... 
Guilford Mills, which emerged tium bankruptcy protection in Oetober, bad the least opulent 
retention plan of local finDs. It covers 47 employees and is to cost $1 million ....). 
40. SeeCampbell,supranote39;GecrgeW. KJJney,HijackingChapter 1I, 21 BANKR.DEv.J.I9, 
77-80 (2004) (discussing bow Cbaprer II debtors making transactions outside the ordinary counc of 
business are limited in making payments out ofthe estate by § 363(b)( I) and must gain cwrt approval for 
such Iran sfcn;. Prior to Senate Bill 2S6 and the new § S03(c) requirements, bankiUptcy courts relied on a 
more relaxed business judgment test: "Retentioo plans will be approved wbere (i) !bedebtorbas fonnulated 
a plan after using proper business judgment and (ii) the court fmds the retention plan to be 'fair and 
reasonable."'); Talaski,supra note 39;seealsoln re MontganeryWanl HoldingCorp.,242B.R. 147,15I, 
ISS (D. Del. 1999) (affirming a 3-part employee incentive plan few over$70 million; the retention incentive 
ponion of the plan provided li>r 10% of !be debtors' key.management employees, i.e., SOO managers 
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listen to testimony advocating the positions ofvarious parties (including the 
committee and the United States Trustee), and each application is granted the 
opportunity for careful scrutiny.41 
Amended Section 503 addressing KERP payments includes far more 
specific rules and particularized limitations on thecircumstances under which 
a reorganizing debtor may pay retention bonuses to key employees.42 Under 
the amended provisions, a payment cannot be made absent a fmding by the 
court that the payment was needed to retain the individual in question based 
on a showing that the person had a bona fide job offer from another entity at 
the same or greater pay, that the person's services are essential to the survival 
of the business, and either the payment was not greater than ten times the 
payments to non-management personnel during the same calendar year or, if 
no such payments were made, no more than 25 percent of the amount paid to 
that person in the previous year.0 It imposes an added burden on the key 
members of debtor's management who seek compensation for the risk of 
staying with a firm as it emerges from bankruptcy-the person seeking 
retention must actually go into the job market and secure a job offer.•• In 
essence, the person or management must prove they are indispensable. The 
particularized provision is presUpposing that the officer of the current debtor 
tbrough vice pnsidCDts. IIDd totaled appi"OI<imately $17.6 miltion); In re Oecqelown Steel Co., 306 B.R. 
S49, 555-56, S59 (Banta. D.S.C. 2004) (approving a retention plan for top exccuti- tbat was not 1D 
exceed $619,766.00 IIDd cenain otbll"bonuses);/n reAerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 77,81 (Banta. D. Mass. 
2001) (granting a motion 1D implement a KERP offering a bonus equal to three months' current aalary for 
upper management to stay on tbrough reorganization); In reAm. W. Airlines, Inc. 171 B.R. 674,675-76, 
678 (Banta. D. Atiz. 1994)(approvingaplan where !be Chief Executive Officer received 125,000 sban:s 
of restricted Class B oommon stock that must be held for at least two years; Chief Operating Officer 
roceived $400,000 casll; 28 othCI" officers IIDd managers received cash bonuses totaling $l,l70,706; and 
rank and filecmployees(appmximlllelyll,OOO) split$9,500,000. Employees who bad been with the debtor 
since the fi6ng received approximately Sl,OOOeach; employees hired post-filing received a lower amount.); 
In relntCI"Co,lnc., I28B.R. 229, 23D-32 (Bsnkr. E.D. Mo. 199l)(approvingaKERPtha!Jrovided for 130 
critical exeeutives, and was valued between approximately $1.8 million and $5.6 million; it alan approved 
a $2 million boous to two executives, payable only if the Chapter II plan was confirmed while the 
individuals were still employed by thedebtoJS);/n re Levinson Steel Co, 117 B.R. 194 (Bankr. W .D. Pa. 
1990) (approving a notention BJ!R'cment IIDd seversnce pay plan for the company's ChiefFinancial Officer, 
finding it to be a necessary inccnti~ to his continued employment during the Chapter II recqani2ation, 
but denying !be debtor company's request for a retention plan for other gcncraJIIDd key employees). 
41. For an example of the process and considerations ofparties in the court approval process for 
KERPs, see Ass'n of Flight Attendants, Legal Discussion Regarding KERP (Feb. 6, 2003), 
bnp:/lwww.unitedafil.or.VreSib/res'kerp_ Jcgalasp. 
42. See Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of200S, cb. 3, see. 331, § S03, 119 Stat. 
23, 102-03. 
43. /d. 
44. Seeid. 
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employer wants to continue to work for a firm in bankruptcy. The capped 
compensation may make that untenable; bow many individuals (other than 
those with ownership interests or stock options) would prefer uncertainty and 
court monitoring to a stable new job at the same or better pay? Thus, this rule 
is constraining a court from perhaps making a decision that is consistent with 
industry practices, industry experience and marketplace realities, and 
ultimately in the firm's (and its creditors') best interests. 
It is widely understood that this provision emerged as a reaction to the 
outsized and highly publicized bankruptcies of Enron,'5 WorldCom•• and 
Global Crossing.<' Congress, perhaps in contrition for their acceptance of 
contributions from these corporate entities in flusher times, made a great show 
of holding hearings and introducing legislation that demonstrated their 
"commitment" to protecting investors from the consequences of 
management's corrupt behaviors. Reactive legislation, beyond the bankruptcy 
provisions, was enacted seemingly overnight. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
45. See generallyIn re Earon Cmp., No. Ol-16034(AJG), 2002Extra LEXIS637(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
May 8, 2002); Memorandum of Law in Support of Debtors' Motion for Approval of a Key Employee 
Retention Program Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Secti011363(b) and to Authorize Administrative Expense 
Priority for Indemnification Claims Arising From Postpetition Services ofl>inctorsand Officers Pursuant 
to Sections 503(b) and 507(a) ofthe Bankruptcy Code, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bania. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002);Enron Executive Retention Plan Stirs Up Flrelllorm ofObjections, 17 ANDREWS 
CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS L!ABD.lTY LinG. REP. 18 (2002)(approving $140 million retention plan for 
Enron on Apr. 16, 2002); Jack Naudi, Conseco Fights to Retain Staff Bonuses Amid Strife, INDIANAPOLIS 
STAR, Dec. 20, 2002, at I A ("In the Eoron case, the Securities and Exchange Commission filed a tnotion 
against a plan to give nearly 1,300 Enron anpl~s.., to $130 million. But in May, a bankruptcy judge 
approved the plan. Tbe judge did grant one SEC request: No Enron anplo)'CC c011victed ofa clime orwho 
engaged in securities tiaud would get bonuses or scvcrance pay."). 
46. See generally Motion ofthe Debtors Pursuant to Sections 363(b) and !05(a) oftbe Banlauptcy 
Code for Authorization to Estabtish a Key Emplo)'CC Retenti011 Plan, In re WorldCom,Jnc, No. 02-13533 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct 18, 2002); In re Woddcom, Inc., No. 02-13533 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct 29, 
2002), available at bttp://www.elawforwoddcom.com/download.asp?DociD-9162&FileiD= 
14624&FileNamF1779-0_l.pdf(last visited Jan. 19, 2006) (approving a retention program for key 
employees but r<;jcctcd CEO plan. Tbe KERP named 329 key anplo)'CCS md totaled appmdmatdy $25 
million.); Borrus,supra note 21, at 82 ("As executive pay soared, sodid retention bonuses, spurring charges 
of abuse. In 2002, a judge presiding over the bankruptcy of the former World Com Inc. approved a $25 
million payout to 329 employees."); Naudi, supra note 45 ("In October, despite objections from virtually 
ev<ry major U.S. telepb011o company, a judge let the company pay 329 managers more than $25 million 
in incentives."). 
47. See generaHy Motion filr !be Debtors for an Onler Pursuant to Scctims 105(a) and 363(b)(l) 
of the Banlauptcy Code Approving and Authorizing the Eatabfisbment of a Retention Program for Key 
Employees, In re Global Crossing Lid., No. 02-40188 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2002); In re Global 
Crossing Ltd., No. 02-40188 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May24, 2002)(notingKERPcost of$8,238,400 plus $5 
million in discretionary timds for key employees essential to !""ttuc:turing). 
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200248 is a notable example. What also grew out of the impulse to "do 
something" with respect to corporate management overreaching was amended 
Section 503. 
The sizeable payments Enron made to certain key employees following · 
its bankruptcy filing captured the public's attention and imagination. For 
example, the bankruptcyjudge approved$140 million in retention bonuses for 
key managers.49 In contrast, Enron's rank and file employees suffered 
substantial losses. 5° The public's outrage in response to these large retention 
payments was aggravated by the circumstances surrounding Enron 's demise: 
it is alleged that massive fraud was perpetuated by Emon's management.51 
It seems clear that this legislative amendment to Section 503 was a 
reaction to a specific, well-publicized problem. But was a legislative response 
the right one? Was there an alternative way of addressing the underlying 
issue? In the absence ofthis "legislative fix," the bankruptcy court could have 
approved or disapproved the terms of Enron's proposed "KERP" program 
based upon the common law necessity doctrine and/or Section 105(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code. 52 And so, was anything gained by the imposition of a 
specific, particularized rule outlining when and to what extent firms in 
bankruptcy can pay retention bonuses? Are the benefits that flow from 
making new laws worth the costs? 
48. Sarbancs-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Sial. 745. 
49. See Eric Berger, Enron 's Prospects for Surviving Ban/cruptcy May Be Improving, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Apr. 22, 2002,81 AI. 
SO. See generaOy LoPuCKI, supra note 36. 
5 I. See BETHANY McLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS rN THE ROOM: THE AMAZING 
RISE AND SCANDALOUS fALL OF ENRON 371 (2003 ). 
52. II U.S.C. § I OS(a) (2000). 
Under Code § lOS(a), the "cwrt may issue any order, process, or judsment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carryout the provisions oftbis title." The outer limits oftbis broadly stated principle 
are tested by tbc "Necessity ofPayment Rule," also known as tbc "Doctrine ofNecessity." It is 
unclear wbetber tbe rule remains valid under the Code. In reuganizltion cases affected with the 
public interest, tbe Necessity ofPsyrncnt Rule may pennit the early paymentofprcpctitioo claims 
of critical creditors wbo thrcstcn otherwise to witbbold goods or services believed to be css<ntial 
to tbe continued viability oftbe debtor's business RDd thus to tbc rcoqpmizalion. The doctrine thus 
does no more tbRD allow a DIP or trustee to succumb to economic sanctions imposed by a creditor 
holding a monopolistic position. It is not a rule ofpriority but is only recognition ofcompelled 
payment. Claimants ba"" no rights pwsuRDt to tbe necessity rule, which is not a rule ofequity at 
all. Indeed, tbe sine qua non of the doctrine is thai tbe claimant is acting in equitably by coercins 
payroll!I. 
2 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAc. 2d § 42:11 (Supp. 2002); JoAnn J. Brighton, The Doctrine ofNecessity: 
Is It Really Necessary?, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 107 (2000); W. Donald Boc, Jr., Necessity, The Mother 
ofA./I Excuses, 12 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER I (Dec. 1991); Russell A. EiscnbeJg & Frances F. Gecker, 
The Doctrine ofNecessity and Its Parametes, 73 MARQ: L. REv. I ( 1989). 
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The costs ofSection 503 are many." The Bankruptcy Code, as enacted 
53. 
Alteady the couns have staded clampingdown on retention deals. For instance, a bankruptcy 
court judge in May rejec10d US Airways Group Inc.['s] .-.quest to pay up 1o $55 million in 
severance and retention plan to its 23 senior C>tecutives snd I ,800 managers to prevent an exodus 
ofmanagers abesd ofthe airline's anticipated merger with America West. That request came after 
the struggling airline sought to cut S I billion annually in labor costs. 
Instead, the court only appmved a plan estimated to cost between $20 million and $28 million 
for its management employte~, not its aecutives. 
Rachel Beck, New BtJIIItruptcy Law Clamps Down on Bonuses, AssociATED PREss, Aug. 9, 2005, 
available athnp://abcnews.ga.com/BusinesslwireStory?id=I022505 (last visited May 13, 2006). 
The new KERP restrictions might lessen the appearance that debtors are benefiting insiders 
inappropriately. Their strict requirements, however, may impair the debtor's ability to keep 
indispensable manag<n-for a KERP to be approved, after aD, the debtor's key employees are 
forced to a undertake a job search, which could welllesd them to accept a more lucrative and stable 
position at a competitor nthcr than stay with the dc:btor. To the eldent the new rules yidd this 
counterproductive result, the ability of the affected debtor to avoid a liquidation, to reorganiz.c 
successfully and to maximize the value of the collalelal will be impaiJed--.til to the detriment of 
its secured creditors. 
Alan M. Christenfeld & Shephard W. Melzer, Secured Traruactions; 200S BtJIIItruptcy Amendments: A 
Secured Creditor's Perspective, N.Y. L.J. Aug. 4, 2005, at5. 
[T]he newprovisions deprive bankruptcy courts oftheir ability to exercise discretion in determining 
which filctors to consider and the relative weight to be given to the various factors whendeciding 
whether to appmve a retention or severance PrtJBI'8DI· 
... [I]f a compaoy planning to file for balllauptcy protection imminently seeks to implement 
a KERP or similar plan, it seems sdvisable to implement such a plan prior to filing bankruptcy. 
Doing so may prevent the need to obtain bankruptcy court approval ofsuch a plan under the strict 
standards imposed by the BAPCPA, and place the bwden motherparties to affumativdy seek to 
avoid pre-bankruptcy payments made to executives purwant to such a plan. 
Gary M. Kaplan, Executive CompD~Sation Issues Under the Bankrvptcy Abuse Prevenllon and Consumer 
Protection Act of200S, J. REP.: L. & PoL'Y S-6 (BNA) (Aug. 2005), available at hnp://howanlrice.com/ 
uploadslcontent/GMK_BNA_Article.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2006); see also NACM Highlights How 
Changes to the Banlavptcy Code WU/ Affect Credit Pros, MANAGING CREDIT, RECErVABLES & 
CoLLECTIONS (Aug. 2005) (quoting Larry Gotllicb of Kronish Lieb Weiner & Helbnan U.P: "But the 
bwden ofprooffer retaining such executives at a certain rate ofpay is sohigh that it wiD have the opposite 
ofthe intended effect; motivating goodmanagement to leave and bad management to stay, to the detriment 
of the reorganization.j. 
Courts are already cracking down m pay-to-stay bmuses. On June IS, the judge in Alexandria, 
Va., overseeing US AirwaysGroup Inc.'s bankruptcyexc..ded 23 senior officers from a plan, worth 
up to $55 miDion, that aimed to keep more than 1,800 managem at the carrier during its merger 
talks with America West Holdings Corp. The proposal hsd triggered a storm of protest from US 
Air's unions, which already have accepted nearly $1 bil6on in pay and benefits cuts. 
Borrus,supra note 21, at82. 
These restrictions could negatively impact business reorganizatims by lesding to the departures of 
management that would otherwise be critical to a suecessful reorganizatim. In particular, requiring 
that insiders have other comparable job offers to be eligible for retention bonuses will induce 
management to undenake a job sean:h at a time when ~eir focus is needed for reorganization 
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in 1978, was a manageable, reasonably accessible set ofrules. Courts could, 
and perhaps should, have reviewed applications for employee retention with 
a sharper eye. But what has occurred in response is a bulkier, more 
cumbersome and a more "impenetrable . . . jungle of special [interest] 
provisions.""4 As Dean Manning aptly observed in critiquing our propensity 
to legislate, "Asignificant part ofthe hyperlexis problem arises from the effort 
to deal with problems with too great particularity. Contrary to surface 
impression, detailed specificity in a legal provision does not reduce disputes; 
particularization merely changes the vocabulary of the dispute.'"'" 
Particularization also limits flexibility. The newrules addressing KERPs 
may make some sense in the context of the Enron case, but, happily, Enron 
was an outlier. Furthermore, the changes were not needed had a court simply 
denied the retention bonuses. The vast majority ofbusiness bankruptcies do 
not involve fraud"" or extreme disparities in compensation between workers 
and management!' In many cases, retention payments outside the parameters 
purposes, and may fiuthcr induce them to take a new position (though not one that is necessarily 
more lucrative) because of the certainty of employment that a new job may provide, versus the 
uncertaintyofstaying the course in cbapter II. The restrictions on bonuses and severance packages 
may also dampen the enthusiasm ofkey penonnel for continued employment with the debtor. 
CraigE. Reimer&Michael P. Ricbman,Commentary, Congress Overhauls the Nation 's Ban/cnq>tcyLaws, 
2 ANDREWS BANKR. Lmo. REP. 2 (May20,200S); Skee~supra note 37,81 1475 ("Probibilingpsy-to-stay 
could pMvent firms from retaining employees they need most In many cases the ~oyees with bonus­
lsden contracts sre new msnagers wbo were brought in prier to bankruptcy to oyersee the restructuring 
effon."). 
Though arguing for less judicial discretion is now in VOIPIC, and Congress has spent several yesrs 
attempting to curtail the discmion ofbankruptcyjudges, there simply is no reason to legislatively 
dictate when bankruptcy courts can approve employee retention cr sevemnce programs. ... If 
bankruptcy courts had excn:ised their discrelion in a haphazard, unpredictable fashion or had not 
required debtors to demonstrate that the psymenls provide a valuable benefit to the estate, Congress 
would be justified in legislatively dictating when such psyments should be allowed. 
A. Mecbele Dickerson, ApprovingEmployee Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial Discretion Run 
Amuck?, II AM.BANKR.iNST.LREv.93,112 (2003). 
The more timeand money a ccmpanyspends rq>lacing fleeing employees, the less itwill be focused 
on restoring the venture's health. That's what is important to creditors, who want to be paid as 
much ofwhat they are owed as possible. Creditors figure the best way to maximize their recovery 
is by keeping experieneed worlten, even ifthey have to pay them something extra. There may not 
be as much money for creditors ifa compsny is plagued by turnover. 
Boselovic, supra note 37. 
S4. Manning, supra note 22, at 773. 
55. Jd. 
56. ECON. CRIMES UNIT, FBI, SHATTERED FAITH: WHITE COLLAR CIUME IN 
AMERICA-BANKRUPTCY FRAUD, available at bttp://www.fbi.gov/hq/cidlfc/eclbflbf.btm Oast visited 
Jan. 19, 2006) (finding the FBI estimates that 10% ofbankruptcies involvelhoud). 
57. 
But the amendment failed to recognize thai key executi'?"' and managers are often contributing to 
513 2006] LEGISLAliVE MESSAGING 
set forth in the amendment to Section 503 may make sense for a 
manufacturingcompanywith long-term experienced management. There may 
be many good reasons--reasons that make business and economic senso--for 
parties and courts to retain existing management, even at a price.51 But, 
because of the hard cases presented by Enron and similar business debtors, 
and some occasional judicial acquiescence without apparent support, we now 
have bad law. 
IV. NEW SECTION 111: MANDATORY CREDIT COUNSELING FOR 

INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS 

Another equally compelling example ofparticularization can be fo101d in 
the new mandates with respect to consumer credit counseling. 59 Contained 
primarily in Sections 1 09(h) and Ill, these were both added as part of the 
2005 Amendments.60 Section 109(h) contains the counseling requirement 
itself and details certain exceptions.61 Section Ill sets forth, among other 
things, the requirements for those seeking to be approved providers ofpre­
bankruptcy budget and credit counseling. 62 The possibility of avoiding 
bankruptcy reliefthrough credit counseling is not a new idea; indeed, it dates 
back to the mid-1960s.63 
Until the 2005 Amendments, consumers were not required to obtain 
counseling as a prerequisite to bankruptcy relief. There was no analog to 
Section I 09(h) and Section 111 in the former Bankruptcy Code.64 Among the 
the solutions, not the problems, of a dislresscd company. It's the ditTorence between Kmart and 
Enron. The fi>rmcr ,..,........illOd successfully md gained enousjl strength to buy Sesrs. The latter 
bad some executiv~ indicted over pre-bankruptcy llaiiSaclions. 
Doyle; supra note 37. 
58. Boselovic, supra note 37 ("'This is the creditoiS' money at this point,' says Robert Lawless, a 
professorat the University ofMissowi's lawschool. 'If the crediiOIS.,., wiDingto pay these peopleto Slay 
... why should anybody outside the situation J:Q(Jy care?'j. 
S9. Bankruptcy Abusel'1ncntionaodConsumerProtectionActof200S,ch.l, Sec.J06, § 109,119 
Stat. 23,37-39. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. 
63. CONSUMERFED'NoF AM. &NAT'LCONSUMER LAw CTR., CREDITCOUNSELING JNCluSJs: THE 
IMPACT ON CONSUMERS OF fuNDING CuTs, HIGHER fEES AND AGGRESSIVE NEW MARKET ENTRANTS 6 
(2003), aval/ableathttp:/lwww.Jaw.upeon.edu/blllulc/UCDC/cfa-nclcreport.pdf(lastvisitcd Jan. 19,2006). 
64. See Susan Block-Ueb, Karm Gross & Richard L. Wieoer, Lessons from the Trenches: Debtor 
Education in Theory ond Practice, 7 FORDHAM J. CoRF. &FIN. L 503, 519-23 (2002); see tdso Karm 
Gross & Susan Block-Ueb, Empty Mandote or Opportunities for Innovation? Pre-Petition Credit 
Counseling and Post-Petition Fiflllllcia/ Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L REv. S49, 
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purposes of this new requirement are that consumers should only make the 
decision to seek bankruptcy relief after considering other plausible 
alternatives; it was perceived that many consumers, perhaps on the advice of 
counsel, were precipitously filing bankruptcies. 65 Moreover, there was a sense 
that ifmore consumers were channeled into pre-bankruptcy debt management 
plans, creditors-mostespecially credit card companies-would receive more 
money than they would receive ifconsumers sought reliefunder Chapter 7 of 
the Code where recoveries are limited for debtors with few exempt assets.66 
Many would agree that thoughtful assessment of alternatives to 
bankruptcy is a wise idea. At the meta level, most people would agree that 
bankruptcy should not be the choice of first resort when there is financial 
strain; bankruptcy is a legal step that should not be undertaken lightly. Its 
consequences-both actual and perceptual-are real.67 Forgetting for a 
moment the fact that, oflate, the credit counseling industry has been subjected 
to considerable criticism for its poor and unscrupulous treatment of 
individuals in debt,68 the notion ofpre-bankruptcy counseling has appeal. 
With that said, there are clearly individuals for whom counseling will not 
be beneficial-either because of the circumstances that led to their 
indebtedness or the quality of advice they received from their legal team. 
· Moreover, to the extent counseling is considered as a national mandate for the 
almost two million individuals who access the system annually, there are some 
individuals who need bankruptcy relief but who cannot readily obtain the 
required counseling. So, any thoughtful and workable mandate needs to 
provide some exceptions built into the system Some of the categories of 
exceptions are self-evident. If there is no counseling available in a given 
region, individuals living in those regions should not be denied access to 
bankruptcy relief. If individuals must file for relief due to exigent 
circumstances and there is no counseling available on an immediate basis, 
absence of counseling should not be grounds for denial of access to the 
bankruptcy process. There are also likely to be categories of individuals for 
whom obtaining counseling will be difficult, if not impossible. It is this 
category of individuals that is addressed in new Section 109(h).69 
562-65 (2005); Colloquium, Consumer Bankruptcy, 61 FORDHAM L. Rllv. 1315 passim (1999). 
65. SENSENBRENNER RJ!PORT, supra note 7. 
66. /d. 
67. Cf § 109, 119 Slat. at 37·39. 
68. See generaUy KAREN GROSS, FAIWRE AND FORGIVENESS: RI!BALANCINO THE BANKRUPTCY 
SYSTEM (1997). 
69. § 109, 119 Slat. at37-39. 
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Section 1 09(h) sets forth in detail those situations in which an exception 
can be made!" What is striking is the degree of particularization that is 
provided, as if courts and debtors' lawyers were not capable of singling out 
those individuals who should obtain a counseling exemption. It is also as if 
there is an assumption that whole groups of individuals will beat down the 
doors to fit within the counseling exception. The level ofdistrust is palpable 
when the details ofSection I 09(h) are unpacked. 
Section 109(h) provides that consumers who are incapacitated, disabled 
and on active military duty can be excepted from the counseling mandate. 71 
However, the definition ofeach ofthese three categories of"excepted" debtor 
is very limited. "Incapacity" is defined in Section 109(h)(4) as "impaired by 
reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of 
realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his fmancial 
responsibilities.'m "Disability" is defined in the same subsection as a person 
"so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate 
in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing [the means bywhichcounseling 
can be delivered]."73 The military exception requires that the debtor be on 
active duty "in a military combat zone."74 Those seeking to fit within these 
narrow exceptions need to obtain court approval.75 
Several things are inunediately obvious from the way in which these 
categories of individuals are defmed. They are so narrowly constructed that 
almost no one will fit within them. Someone who fits the definition of 
incapacitated would be someone who likely could not even seek bankruptcy 
relief without a conservator or guardian authorized to file for the relief on 
their behalf; this is because few, if any, courts would permit an individual so 
lacking in rational thought to be a debtor. Consider how disabled a person 
would need to be in order to be considered unable to obtain some 
counseling-notjust in person but over the telephone or Internet. Basically, 
the only person who would fit the criteria would be someone in a coma, on a 
ventilator, or who was both deafand blind. Arguably, a quadriplegic would 
not satisfy the test ifsomeone could hold a phone to the person's ear or place 
the counseling call on a speaker. The only members of the military who 
would fit within this exception would seem to be those in Iraq or perhaps 
70. /d. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. at 37-38. 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 37. 
75. Id. at 37-39. 
516 UNIVERSI1Y OF PITI'SBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:497 
Afghanistan, which may be the only locations we consider active military 
zones. Soldiers on a submarine or on an aircraft carrier would not fit within 
the exception. 
By creating this level ofspecificity, judicial discretion is eliminated as if 
the judiciary were not capable of determining individuals who were 
sufficiently incapacitated ordisabled to enable an exception to the counseling 
mandate. Indeed, the message seems to be that many debtors would claim to 
be incapacitated or disabled to avoid the counseling requirement, with no 
evidence that this category of individual was desirous of gaming the system. 
Indeed, one could hypothesize that those with these impairments may be 
seeking debt relief because their medical and custodial costs are so high and 
their insurance, if any, so inadequate, that they need financial relief. Indeed, 
given their situation, relief from fmancial burdens seems to be the least the 
legal system can provide. While debt among military personnel is a very real 
problem,76 it is difficult to justify an exception for those only in a combat 
zone; debt can and does occur when one is serving abroad in a military but 
non-combat arena. 77 
One can also posit some individuals who should be excepted from 
counseling who do not fit within the three identified categories. The new 
legislation prohibits the courts from creating additional exceptions for these 
prospective debtors.78 Consider someone who cannot find counseling in their 
native language. Consider someone with enormous caregiving obligations­
for an ill child and elderly parents, for example. While the debtor him or 
herself is not incapacitated or disabled, those in their charge could be. So, the 
statutory language is delimiting in two ways: first, the categories for 
exception are limited and, second, within the categories, 1he eligible recipients 
are limited. 
A further· requirement is that if an individual fits within the required 
categories, there is the added hurdle that a court must approve the exception. 79 
The requirement specifies that such approval is based on notice and a 
76. See generally Steven M. Graves & Christopher L Petenc11, Predatory Lending and the 
Military: The Law and Geography of "Paydoy" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHro ST. L.J. 653 passim 
(2005). 
77. See The Center for Responsible Lending, Predatory Lending and Its Impact on the Military and 
Local Communities, Mar. 29, 2005, available at bnp://www.raponaiblelendinJI.Oil!/pdtSffestimony­
Gra..,s _pa)day.()3290S .pdf(lastvisi1ed Jan.21, 2006);see also LorinT. Smith, Military Attacks Vultvrous 
Tactics of Paydoy Lenders, NEWS TR.ro. (Tacoma, Wash.), Jan. 18, 2006, available at http:// 
www.thenewstribune.com/news/govemmCIII/story/5465 I S7p-4931371 c.btml (last visited Jan. 21 , 2006). 
78. See II U.S.C.A. § 109(b) (West 2005). 
79. See id. 
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hearing-which means that a hearing need not necessarily be held under 
Section 102(1).80 However, someone--whether or not they are a 
lawyer-wouldstill need to prepare an appropriate request, likely in the form 
of a motion. Clearly, anyone who fits within the exception would not be 
capable of appearing in court, at least not without huge expenses and delay. 
So, it would require, one must assume, some sort of"paper proof.""' How 
much proof must be obtained is unclear. 
The perceived distrust of consumer debtors, their lawyers and the 
judiciary has led to a series ofexceptions that are so particularized that few 
genuinely challenged debtors fit within them. The counseling mandate is, 
then, required of virtually all debtors. While on its face the information 
offered by quality counseling would be beneficial (who can argue with more 
information being bad?), the narrowness of the exceptions sends a message 
that all debtors-regardless ofhow they ended up in debt--can benefit from 
counseling. Indeed, it is worth observing that there are whole categories of 
debtors for whom bankruptcy is the right alternative because ofcircumstances 
beyond their control; the degree of"financial responsibility" ofan uninsured 
person with cancer, burdened with medical debts, will not change with 
counseling. Stated differently, the mandate is so broad and the exceptions so 
narrow that we homogenize debtors and their problems. Whatever else it is, 
counseling should not be oversold as a solution to all that strikes debtors; at 
best, it will help some of the debtors some of the time. That message is not 
conveyed by the 2005 Amendments. That is legislation gone awry. 
V. Is THERE A MESSAGE IN SiLENCE? 
Given the number ofyears the bankruptcy amendments were debated, the 
Commission that was created, and the dozens of witnesses who prepared 
reports and publicly testified about the bankruptcy law's virtues and failings, 
one would think that the near 300 pages ofamendments would be, if nothing 
else, comprehensive. Clearly there was opportunity, over the course ofeight 
years of discussion, to address and provide resolutions for every open, 
outstanding and unresolved issue that has arisen and could arise in the 
bankruptcy context. UnfOrtunately, there remain a number ofimportant issues 
that Congress failed to tackle in the course of drafting the bankruptcy 
80. Id. 
81. See id. 
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amendments, leaving unanswered many compelling issues. 82 The question 
raised by this failure to legislat~when there was clear opportunity-is 
whether there was an embedded message in this silence. 
One issue Congress failed to address is the bankruptcy treatment offuture 
claims, claimants and obligations.83 The concept offuture obligations and the 
use of bankruptcy to deal with mass torts, product liability claims and 
environmental obligations was not originally addressed by the Bankruptcy 
Code. Accordingly, the definition of "claim" in Section 101(5) does not 
explicitly include these future obligations, nor does the Bankruptcy Code 
specify when a claim or obligation arises.•• Courts have danced around 
alternative approaches in an effort to reach a resolution of these issues." In 
the absence ofan explicit Code provision, some courts have expansively read 
"future claims" into the defmition ofclaim;86 others have not been so willing 
to stretch the existing definition of"claim," holding that only those rights to 
payment which arise before the petition or during the Chapter 11 process can 
be considered claims under bankruptcy law.87 Only for asbestos claims has 
there been a legislative amendment to the Code.88 And yet, both the issue of 
when a claim arises and whether a future claim is even recognized are critical 
in a bankruptcy proceeding;•• experience over the past twenty-five years has 
82. Examples include the absence of addre111ing timited tiability co""""ies' treatment in 
banlauptcy, failure to address mass tcrt trtatment in bankruptcy, issues surrounding banlauptcy ~ole 
entities, and broader channeling injunctions. 
83. Cf Kathryn R. Heidt, Products Lillbility, Mass Torts and Environmentlll Obligations In 
Bankruptcy: Suggestions for Reform, 3 AM. BANKR.!NST. L REv. 117passim ( 1995); Kathryn R. Heidt, 
Future Claims in Bankruptcy: The NBC Amendments Do Not Go Far Enough, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 5 I5 
passim (1995). 
84. II U.S.CA. § I0 I(S) (West 200S);seeal.so Heidt,supra note 83, at 117-18. Katluyn R. Heidt, 
Environmental Obligatiom in Banlcruptcy: A Fundamental Framework, 44 Fl.A. L. REv. 153 (1992); 
Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims &riously: Future Claims and Successor LiabiUty in Banlcruptcy, 
49 CASEW. REs. L REv. 435,456-58 (1999). 
85. KATHRYN R. HEIDT,ENviRONMENTAL0aLJGA110NSIN 8ANKRUPTCVft 3-30, 3-85 to -90(West 
2002). 
86. Gradyv.A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198,202-03 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Emons lndus.,lnc., 220 
B.R. 182, 193-94 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
87. Epstein v. Official Comm. ofUnsecured Cn:ditom, 58 F.3d 1573, 1577 (lith Cir. 1995);/n re 
M. Fn:nville Co., 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984). Wbile not a mass tort case, the Third Circuit bas 
depaned with other circuits in holding that a claim not yet fully cognizable under state law could not be 
dealt with in bankruptcy. ld. 
88. II U.S.C. § S24(g) (2000). 
89. Generally, only those holding "claims" that "arose" pre-petition (or pro.confinnatim in a 
Chapter II case) are allowed to participate in the bankruptcy process, vote on a Chapter II plan 8lld receive 
a distribution. II U .S.C. § 726(a). Only those claims that arose before the specified time are discharged. 
II U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 1141. 
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demonstrated that if future obligations cannot be addressed in a UJ.apter II 
case, the value ofa bankruptcy filing will be impaired significantly.90 
Another issue the Code and the 2005 bankruptcy amendments fail to 
address is the treatment ofLLCs: there is no explicit mention ofLLCs in the 
text ofthe Bankruptcy Code and no provision in the amendments remedying 
this omission. Particularly in recent years, the Code's application to and 
intersection with LLCs has raised myriad issues ripe for resolution. 
Since their initial introduction in I977 ;' LLCs have increasingly been 
used as traditional business entities, largely due to their inherent flexibility 
and liability limiting features.92 LLCs have also been the entity ofchoice for 
special purpose entities used in connection with structured finance 
transactions!3 When LLCs have been involved in a bankruptcy case, in the 
face of the Code's silence, transaction parties have sought to characterize 
them as, and draw analogies to, corporations as well as partnerships. 94 The 
quest has been to fit LLCs into the Bankruptcy Code's rubric. There are 
credible arguments supporting alternative characterizations-arguments all 
grounded in the Code. Multiple Code provisions--the section on involuntaty 
cases,9' the definitional provisions,96 the provisions on executory contracts,97 
the definition of property of the estate-and comparisons and analogies to 
other questions98-can be cited to in support of one position or the other. 
Rating agencies and transaction parties, as well as influential treatises such as 
90. Kathryn R. Heidt, Undermining Bankruptcy LawandPolicy: Torwico Electronics, Inc. v. New 
Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection, 56 U. PITT. L. REv. 621, 65~53 (1995). 
91. Laura Castaiieda, Structuring Your Company? Laak at the BenejltsofLLCs, Bus. WK., Apr. 6, 
1999, available at http://www.businossweek.com/smallbizlnewsldate/99041e990406.htm (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2006) ("LLCs wen: introduced in 1977 in Wycming, which aimed to become a more business­
friendly stat<: byeliminating double taxation andcreating a business sttuchm: that, unlike., S ccnporatim, 
allows for mreign investors. Today, )'OU can furman ILC in all SO states and the District ofColumbia."). 
92. LLCs are eligible for"check-the-box" or pass-through taxatimt, meaning that their profits are 
taxed at the membcr-Ieve~ not the entity level. See 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2 (2005); see also Report by the 
Committ<:e on Bankruptcy and Corpomte Reorganization ofthe Association ofthe Bar of the City ofNew 
York,New Developments in Stnu:tured Finance, 56 Bus. LAw. 95 (2000) (refetring to the use ofDelaware 
LLCs as "ubiquitous in the structured marl<et"). 
93. SimeonGold,ChaiceofBusiness Entity for Commercia/Transactions, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 16,1995, 
at I; Richard M. Graf, Use ofiLCs as Bon/cruptcy-Pmof Entities Widens, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 10, 1995, at 
BI6. 
94. See In re ICLNDS Nilles Acquisition, ILC, 259 B.R. 289, 292-93 (Baukr. N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(discussing bow to categori2e LLCs). 
95. 11 U.S.CA. § 303 (West 2005). 
96. /d. § 101. 
97. /d. § 365. 
98. ld. § S41. 
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Col/iers,99 have all taken the position that LLCs ought to be treated as 
corporations under the Code. Yet, the rating agencies recognize the 
uncertainty in connection with certain transactions engaged in by LLCs and 
require legal opinions to conclude asmuch. 100 Notwithstanding the thousands 
of transactions involving LLCs that have gone forward in reliance on the 
position that, under bankruptcy law, LLCs are most aptly characterized as 
corporations, there remain strong arguments that LLCs are more like 
partnerships, and thus should be treated as such under the Bankruptcy Code.'"' 
The few courts addressing issues related to LLCs are divided in their 
approaches.102 Because of the Bankruptcy Code's sileil.ce on this issue, 
organizers are faced with uncertainty as to how to minimize many bankruptcy­
and insolvency-related risks. 
In light ofthe absence ofa definitive resolution ofhow LLCs ought to be 
treated in bankruptcy, the risks LLCs and their members are subject to are 
many: (i) the risk a transaction originator, as the sole LLC member, will 
compel the LLC to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition; (ii) the risk that the 
LLC will fail to survive the originator/sole member's bankruptcy or 
dissolution; (iii) the open question of whether an LLC member can file an 
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the LLC; 103 and (iv) the uncertainty 
99. See, e.g., CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 303.07(6), at 303-63 to -64 (Lawrence P. King, Alan N. 
Resnick & Hemy J. SOIDIIlOI" eels., 15th ed. nov. 2006). 
An important feature ofan lLC is that it is owned by members, rather than partnm or shareholders, 
and the mcmbeJs eqjoy the same general limited liability protection as that afforded to sharcholdm 
ofa corporatino. Though a few banknlpt<:y courts have analogized members ofan LLC to partom 
ofa partnership in certain contexts, such as when considering the effect ofa member's banknaptcy 
on its continued exercise ofmembership rights, LLCs arc not partnerships and men>hcrs arc not 
general partners. Thcrcfon:, section 303(b )(3) ofthe Bankruptcy Code, which provides that fewer 
than all general partners may file an involuntary petition against a partnersbll, should not be 
available to members ofan LLC. Moreover, it would not further the purpose ofsection 303 (b)(3), 
whieh is to protect general partners who arc pcrsonaDy tiable for debts ofthe partncrsbip, to make 
it available to LLC members who have limitcd liabitity protection similar to that afforded 
sharcboldcrs ofa corpaation. 
ld. (citations omitled). 
I 00. Alexander Dill ct al, Special Report, Handle With Care: Single Member UCs in S1ruet11rerl 
Transactions, MoonY'SINVESTORSSERV.,Mar. 19,1999,atl;MiehaciD.Ficlding,~ling Voluntary 
and Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions by Limited Liability Companies, 18 BANKO<. DEv. J. Sl (2001). 
101. This is the position 1akcn by the National Banknlptcy Review Commissim. NAT'L BANKR. 
REVIEWCOMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TwENTY YEARS 418 (1997). 
102. See In re ICLNDS Notes Acquisition, LLC, 259 B.R. 289, 292-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) 
(stating that, unlike in some states whieh view LLCs as either corporations or pannerships, Ohio employs 
a hybrid approach). 
103. Since LLCs cannot be definitively cluuacterizcd as either panncrships cr corporations, the 
question ofwhether an LLC mcmhcr can file an invo~tary bankruptcy petitim agaiDSI thelLC mnains 
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surrounding the effect ofa sole member's bankruptcyon an LLC. Moreover, 
LLCs risk a judicial characterization, and thus an outcome in bankruptcy that 
is inconsistent with the intent of the LLC and its transaction's counterparties. 
The market has been functioning in reliance on the terms pursuant to 
which LLCs are organized as being enforceable in bankruptcy. If a 
bankruptcy court fails to enforce a particular term in an LLC statute or 
operating agreement because it has characterized the LLC as akin to another 
entity for bankruptcy purposes, the markets in which LLCs operate, including 
the near $2.5 trillion dollar structured finance market, may experience a 
seismic tremor. 
And so the gaps in the laws with respect to future claims and LLCs are 
wide. At times it seems as if the law's silence with respect to these issues is 
deafening. But is there a message in this silence? 
The simple answer is "yes"-there is a message in this silence. But, as 
with messaging and new legislation, the answer is multifaceted. As previously 
developed, we read into the 2005 bankruptcy amendments a message of 
distrust When we observe silence, however, one central explanation for the 
silence is the converse: trust. Trust in certain participants in the bankruptcy 
process, and trust in the markets in which bankruptcy plays out. 
With respect to the law's treatment of LLCs and their role in the 
structured finance market, trust is evident in the confidence expressed in the 
finite pool of sophisticated players and the markets in which they operate. 
These players created the financial instrument, developed the market and 
oversee its operation. Few outside this complex market can understand it 
fully. When transactional risks surface, the players are agile: they can readily 
develop solutions or alternatives and, in so doing, they circumvent problems 
as, or even before, they occur.104 In a sense, the way the structured fmance 
market operates makes it self-contained (for better or worse), and there is an 
open in the securitizatim context, as well as in other cmtcxts. In the case ofpartn""'bips, Sectim 303 
provides that a general partner may trigger the filing ofan involuntauy case against the partnership. There 
is no COJql&l1lble provisim in the Code with~~ to siwdloldcrs ofa corpotation wbo cannot trigger 
a filing unless they arc creditoiS. So, one needs to dctcmline whether !LCs abould be treated as a 
partn..,bip or a C01p0r81ion for purposes ofinvoking an involuntary filing under Sectim 303. Permitting 
geoeraJ partners to trigger an involuntary case apinst their pariDC1Sbip was intended to protect general 
partners who might be exposed to pcrsmal liability based 011 the actions of anoth ... partner in their 
partn..-abipcapacity. Essentially, Section 303(bX3) protects one gcncnol partner from anotbcrpartn..-wbo 
bas bad judgment, docs not act for the good of the partnerabip, or is just plain unscrupulous. 
I04. See generally Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Banktvptcy Process: The Statutory 
Institutionalization ofSecuritization, 33 CoNN. L. Rl!v. 199 passim (2000) (describing how the design of 
securitization transactions bas the potential to insulate a deb~ from the claims ofits creditors). 
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unwillingness among the market participants to let outsiders tinker-let alone 
change-that world. A legislative solution, then, would strip these 
participants of control and threaten the world they have created. As such, a 
hands-off approach has flourished and, by silence, legislators have acquiesced. 
Whether the trust given to the players and their markets is deserved is actually 
not our question (although it is certainly one worth pursuing). Instead what 
we observe is the presence of trust and that very presence accounts for the 
accompanying legislative silence. 
The context in which environmental hazards are addressed obviously 
differs from the structured finance context. It is not a closed universe of 
sophisticated players; future claims implicate businesses ofevery ilk. In more 
obvious ways than the banlauptcy-related issues implicated in structured 
fmance transactions, the treatment offuture claims facially implicates major 
social issues (such as health and well-being). With that said, the failure to 
legislate does suggest that there is trust in non-bankruptcy solutions to these 
issues-thus the absence of legislation. Perhaps there is a fear that a new 
banlauptcy-based legislative solution-before any major tort reform 
legislation takes hold-will negatively impact corporate research, 
development, insurability and market pricing. Indeed, a new bankruptcy 
solution could threaten corporate longevity. With such potential·risks, no 
solution (hence silence) may be a better solution. Whether this is an accurate 
perception of the impact of legislating with respect to future claims is again 
not our question (although thinking through tort reform is certainly worthy of 
discussion); our goal is to identify and explain silence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Legislation needs to be read in light of political, social and cultural 
influences. In the context of the 2005 Amendments to the bankruptcy laws, 
we set about to explain the messages embedded in this new body oflaw. The 
overarching message broadcast by the new bankruptcy legislation is one of 
distrust. Distrust accounts for the Code's new particularization. What is 
disturbing is that the deep distrust ofthe system's key players was not overtly 
discussed, and the rhetoric surrounding the Code amendments was all about 
helping to improve the system and root out abuse. What this means is that 
what the Code says and what the Code means are two different things. 
Legislative silence sends a similar. message. Although perhaps less 
pernicious, we have identified trust and faith in organizations and players that 
may not be so deserving. 
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Whether sending a message ofdistrust or trust, the 2005 Amendments to 
the Bankruptcy Code should be faulted for the absence of transparency and 
honesty. That is a message that is clear and unequivocal. 

